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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is an appeal by Melvin Thomas from a judgment in 
a criminal case following a jury verdict of guilty on the 
charge of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to 
distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 846.1 Because the evidence adduced 
at trial was insufficient to support the verdict, we will reverse.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Thomas was tried on a four-count indictment that also included 
charges of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1); attempted importation of cocaine, 18 U.S.C. § 952(a); and 
carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). 
However, he was acquitted of all but the conspiracy count. 
 
2. In view of this disposition, we need not address the other points raised 
on appeal. Principally, we do not reach Thomas' contention that the 
court erred when it denied Thomas' request to instruct the jury on 
character evidence. Thomas has also challenged the refusal of the 
district court to exclude from evidence the telephone number retrieved 
from the pager that he had on his person at the time of his arrest, 
alleging that it should have been suppressed because of an unlawful 
search and seizure. We believe that the seizure falls within an exception 
to the warrant requirement as a lawful search incident to arrest. Again, 
we need not formally decide that issue because, even with the inclusion 
of that material, the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction. 
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I. 
 
On the morning of February 10, 1995, the United States 
Customs Service at the Cyril E. King airport on St. Thomas 
seized twenty-four kilograms of cocaine from a suitcase 
checked to Atlanta, Georgia. The officials identified the 
owner of the bag as Jennifer Lynch, whose plane had 
already departed for Atlanta. Customs officials on St. 
Thomas notified officials in Atlanta, and they arrested 
Lynch pursuant to a warrant when she arrived there. Lynch 
agreed to cooperate. She informed the agents that one Allan 
Petersen had directed her to take the suitcase carrying the 
cocaine to Atlanta, check into a room at the Atlanta Airport 
Days Inn, call him at a Virgin Islands telephone number, 
leave the bag with the cocaine in the room, return the key 
to the front desk in an envelope for "Melvin Smith" or 
"Cousin Melvin Smith," leave the Days Inn, check into 
another hotel for the night, and return to St. Thomas the 
following day. 
 
Along with agents, Lynch checked into room 510 of the 
Airport Days Inn. Monitored by the agents, Lynch placed a 
phone call to the designated telephone number. She 
informed the agents that she had spoken to Petersen and 
given him the hotel room number. An envelope containing 
the room key was then left at the front desk for "Cousin 
Melvin Smith." Customs officials also left an empty suitcase 
in room 510 and set up surveillance directly across the hall 
in room 509. 
 
In due course, Thomas entered room 510. The officers 
observed him and arrested him when he exited the room a 
few minutes later. They took from Thomas a 9mm pistol 
registered to him, a pager, a cellular phone, a Virgin 
Islands driver's license, the envelope with "Cousin Melvin 
Smith" written on it, and the room key. They retrieved from 
the pager the same telephone number at which Lynch had 
called Petersen from the hotel room. Thomas agreed to 
answer questions. He told the agents that he went to the 
room because a person named Cliff had offered him 
$500.00 to check on a bag at the hotel, but that he knew 
nothing about a cocaine deal. Petersen's phone records 
showed several calls to the pager and cellular phone carried 
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by Thomas on the day of his arrest, and to Thomas' home 
phone. 
 
Thomas was tried in the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands, together with Petersen. Lynch, who had pled guilty 
to the conspiracy count prior to trial, testified, on behalf of 
the government, that Petersen had offered to pay her to 
take the cocaine to Atlanta, relating the facts described 
above. She also testified that she did not know Thomas, 
and had not conspired with him to possess cocaine with 
intent to distribute. Petersen took the stand in his own 
defense. He too testified that he did not know Thomas, and 
that he had not conspired with him to possess cocaine with 
intent to distribute. 
 
Thomas then took the stand, and testified as follows. On 
the morning of his arrest, he received a phone call from 
"Cliff," whom he did not know. Cliff informed Thomas that 
he had obtained Thomas' telephone number from a mutual 
friend. Cliff asked Thomas if he would do him a favor, and 
stated that he would call later that day. Later that day, 
Thomas received a call from his home on his pager. He 
returned the call to his home and was advised that Cliff 
was trying to reach him. He told the party answering to 
have Cliff contact him on his cellular phone. Shortly 
thereafter, his testimony continued, he received a call from 
Cliff who asked him to go to the Airport Days Inn, ask the 
front desk clerk for a key left for "Cousin Melvin Smith," go 
to the room, open the door, close the door without locking 
it, and return the key to the front desk. Finally, Thomas 
testified that he did not know either Lynch or Petersen, that 
he had not conspired with them to possess cocaine with 
intent to distribute, and that he had no knowledge of any 
such scheme or conspiracy. 
 
II. 
 
In reviewing Thomas' contention that the evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his conspiracy 
conviction, we must determine whether "there is 
substantial evidence, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the government, to support the jury's verdict." 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Isaac, 50 F.3d 1175, 
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1179 (3d Cir. 1995). The elements of a conspiracy may be 
proven entirely by circumstantial evidence, see United 
States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986), but 
each element must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
United States v. Samuels, 741 F.2d 570, 573 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 
There can be no doubt that, when Thomas pursued his 
errand at the Days Inn, he knew that he was somehow 
involved in an illicit activity. More, however, is required to 
uphold a criminal conviction for conspiracy. Specifically, 
one of the elements that must be proven by the government 
beyond a reasonable doubt in a conspiracy case is that the 
"alleged conspirators shared a `unity of purpose,' the intent 
to achieve a common goal, and an agreement to work 
together toward the goal." United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 
88, 90-91 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Kates, 508 
F.2d 308, 310-11 (3d Cir. 1975)). We have explained that, 
in order to sustain a conspiracy conviction, the government 
must put forth " `evidence tending to prove that defendant 
entered into an agreement and knew that the agreement 
had the specific unlawful purpose charged in the 
indictment.' " Id. at 91 (quoting United States v. Scanzello, 
832 F.2d 18, 20 (3d Cir. 1987)). While Thomas concedes 
that there is evidence tending to show that he entered into 
some kind of agreement, he contends that the evidence 
presented at trial is insufficient to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the essential element that he knew that 
the purpose of the agreement was the specific unlawful 
purpose charged in the indictment, i.e., the possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute. We view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, but 
are nonetheless constrained to agree with Thomas. 
 
There is no evidence that Thomas had any prior 
relationship with Lynch or Petersen, or even knew them. 
Lynch and Petersen specifically denied knowing Thomas. 
Moreover, the record does not show anything about the 
substance of the calls made to Thomas' home, to his 
cellular phone, or to his pager. Indeed, there was no 
evidence, apart from the fact that several phone calls were 
made from Petersen's phone to Thomas' home, cellular 
phone, and pager on the date of his arrest, that Thomas 
ever spoke with either Lynch or Petersen on February 10 or 
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any time before or after that date. Nor did the government's 
evidence controvert what Thomas told the agents following 
his arrest or what he testified to about his reasons for going 
to the Days Inn. 
 
The government's case depends upon the drawing of an 
inference from the fact and the timing of the calls made 
from Petersen's phone that Thomas in fact spoke to 
Petersen several times on February 10, 1995 and was told 
that drugs were in the bag at the Days Inn. Even assuming 
that it is permissible to infer from the evidence that 
Petersen was "Cliff" and that Thomas spoke to him, which 
is doubtful, there was no evidence concerning the 
substance of the phone calls. It is, therefore, speculative to 
conclude that Thomas knew that drugs were involved. Our 
conspiracy case law forbids the upholding of a conviction 
on the basis of such speculation. 
 
In Wexler, supra, for example, where we reversed the 
defendant Wexler's conviction for conspiracy to distribute 
hashish, we held that the "inferences rising `from keeping 
bad company' are not enough to convict a defendant for 
conspiracy." Id. at 91 (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 
F.2d 252, 254-55 (3d Cir. 1977)). We noted that there was 
ample circumstantial evidence from which the jury could 
have concluded that Wexler was involved in a conspiracy to 
transport some kind of contraband in a Ryder truck: he 
drove a car in a manner that suggested that he was a 
lookout for the truck movement; a fictitiously obtained CB 
radio was in the car he drove when he was arrested; and he 
made a gesture consistent with signaling one of the 
conspirators and spoke with another several times during 
the course of the operation. Id. But what was missing, we 
found, "was any evidence that Wexler knew that a 
controlled substance was couched behind the doors of the 
Ryder truck. That knowledge is an essential element of the 
conspiracy charged. Without it the conviction must fail." Id. 
We explained that: 
 
[i]t is more likely than not that Wexler suspected, if not 
actually knew, that some form of contraband was 
involved in the elaborate secretive arrangements for 
transport in which he participated. But these 
permissible inferences do not support a holding that 
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the government met its burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Wexler knew this was a 
conspiracy to transport hashish or even another 
controlled substance. The evidence is just as 
consistent, for example, with a conspiracy to transport 
stolen goods, an entirely different crime. 
 
Id. at 92. 
 
Similarly, in United States v. Terselich, 885 F.2d 1094 (3d 
Cir. 1989), the defendant was convicted of possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute and conspiracy to possess 
cocaine with intent to distribute. Terselich was a passenger 
in car that was pulled over on I-95 by the Delaware State 
Police. Cocaine was discovered in a secret compartment in 
the trunk of the car. We reversed the convictions for 
insufficiency of the evidence, reasoning that there was less 
evidence presented in that case than in Wexler "from which 
the jury could have inferred that Terselich knew of a 
conspiracy and that its object was to transport the illegal 
drugs." Id. at 1098. More specifically, we pointed out that 
the evidence that Terselich shared driving responsibilities 
and lodging with the driver of the car and placed his 
luggage in the trunk of the car along with the fact that 
Terselich appeared nervous when he was stopped was not 
enough to support the inference that Terselich knew that 
there was cocaine in the secret compartment in the trunk. 
Id. 
 
Based on this case law, we conclude that, as there is no 
evidence from which a jury could permissibly infer that 
Thomas knew that the object of the conspiracy was to 
possess cocaine with the intent to distribute, the evidence 
cannot support Thomas' conspiracy conviction. We will, 
therefore, reverse the judgment and direct the district court 
to enter a judgment of acquittal. 
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